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Abstract - The contemporary debate on democracy and change in
Africa appears to have largely concentrated on the current and
future role of political parties and the relative merits and
demerits of multi-party politics vis-a-vis single party rule
during the 1980s and 1990s. In the case of Uganda, little
attention has been paid to the historical background to the
present. In particular, a major lacuna has been the role played
by organisations based outside the country for most of the 1970s
in the struggle to remove the regime of Idi Amin (1971-1979) from
power in Uganda. This paper seeks to make a contribution towards
filling this gap by critically considering the part played by
such organisations in the anti-Amin resistance which culminated
in the formation of the Uganda National Liberation Front in March
1979 and the establishment of the first post-Amin government a
month later. While recognizing the proliferation of similar
bodies in exile particularly in the period 1976-79, this paper
concentrates on two Zambia-based groups, the Uganda Liberation
Group (Z) and the Uganda National Movement.
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Introduction
The starting point of this preliminary study of the anti-Amin
resistance is the removal of the regime from power in April 1979.
With the benefit of hindsight, several scholars have debated the
question whether the action amounted to the 'liberation' of the
peoples of Uganda and signalled the beginning of a return to
democratic rule or whether it was merely the prelude to yet
another phase in the struggle for the achievement of true
"people's power" or popular'democracy1. Among the most frequently
repeated questions in the aftermath of the Amin regime's fall was
the extent to which the 'returnees' or exiles had contributed to
the 'liberation' of the country and whether the local civilian
population inside the country had been largely passive observers
through the years. Given the brutality and viciousness of the
regime, an impression had been created that no popular resistance
was possible internally. On arrival in Kampala, the exiles and
:M. Mamdani, 'Uganda Now', Ufahamu, 15, 3(1986/87),33-53; B.
Nyeko, 'The Background to the Political Instability in Post-Amin
Uganda1, ibid.,11-32;A. Omara-Otunnu, 'The Struggle for Democracy
in Uganda1/ Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 3 (1992) ,443-463.
the Tanzanian military officers who had backed them in the anti-
Amin war compounded the situation by camping at the country's
most expensive and exclusive hotels in strikingly luxurious
circumstances that contrasted sharply with the poor state in
which the vast majority of the Ugandan populace lived. The
social tension that this gave rise to within a very short period
was self-evident23.
For the scholar of Uganda's contemporary history, the above
picture surely draws attention to important questions relating
to such issues as the nature of 'popular resistance', the links
between internal and external movements, the role of the
extraneous factor (i.e foreign elements such as the participation
of the Tanzanian troops and the role of Libya), the nature of the
political alignments amongst Ugandans both at home and in exile,
and the ever-present question of national leadership4. This paper
examines the part played by the short-lived exile organisation
based in Zambia which came to be known as the Uganda Liberation
Group (Z) in the period 1977-79 and not only participated in the
controversial Moshi Unity Conference of March 1979 but was
represented in all the four post-Amin governments in Uganda from
April 1979 to December 1980. An attempt will be made to relate
2An indication of this tension comes from S.Lwanga-
Lunyiigo's unpublished papers where he observes that some
'"liberators" felt they were entitled to the fruits of ...
"liberation"'. Cited in Phares Mutibwa, Uganda Since
Independence,London: Hurst, 1992, p. 153.
3.
'some of these issues have been tackled by C.
Gertzel,'Uganda after Amin: the continuing search for leadership
and control',African Affairs,19,3X7(Oct.1980),461-489 and in her
previous writings on Uganda.
the discussion to the issues identified above. On the basis of
the available evidence, it seems reasonable to suggest that the
operations of organisations such as the ULG(Z) and such similar
bodies were best suited for the realisation of short-term answers
to the social and political objectives of the membership, rather
than for the achievement of long-term democratic change in the
country. This surely helps explain why the Uganda National
Liberation Front (UNLF), the umbrella organisation formed at
Moshi in northern Tanzania in March 1979, was unable to transform
itself into a political party or indeed to establish a stable
administration once the Amin regime had collapsed5.
Sources and Some Recent Interpretations
The study of comparatively recent political history is, of
course, replete, with several difficulties. One such difficulty
relates to sources. Apart from contemporary newspaper reports
from both inside Uganda and the outside world, the more
established and regular overseas periodical publications such as
Africa Confidential, Africa Diary: Weekly Diary of African
Events, Africa Contemporary Record etc, and a few documents
issued by the organisations themselves, one must rely on the
personal testimony of some of the participants as well as one's
own personal observation. Axiomatically, the information garnered
from individual participants will be coloured by their desire,
in nearly all the cases, to justify themselves while explaining
'Phares Mutibwa's recent Uganda Since Independence offers a
fascinating account of the activities of the 'liberators'. His
interpretation of the Amin regime seems to rest on a theory that
can best be described as reflecting Uganda's self-inflicted
agony. See especially pp.85 and 120.
their own particular role in the events they describe. Another
type of difficulty emanates from the fact that for all its
universally acclaimed virtues in scholarship, objectivity in the
study of a subject such as this one is particularly elusive6.
That the literature on the Idi Amin regime and its fall from
power is copious and continues to grow is commonplace and has
been remarked upon by several scholars. Indeed, the spate of
books and articles on it in the 197O's and early 1980's may be
cited as a rather fine example of the construction of populist
'instant history'. What is less well known, however, is the
origins of the UNLF itself and its antecedents. It is easy enough
to appreciate the inability of the UNLF to survive the heady
politics of the first few months of post-Amin Uganda. Yet it
would appear to be perfectly legitimate to set its activities
within a historical context in order to begin to understand the
present.
There have, for example, been several interpretations of the
Moshi Unity Conference which gave birth to the UNLF. One of the
most detailed accounts of the background and formation of the
organisation was Daniel Omara-Atubo's mimeograph7. A young
Makerere graduate from northern Uganda, Omara-Atubo had spent his
exile days in Kenya and Tanzania and had himself participated in
the Moshi Conference as a delegate of the 'Moshi Group', one of
the numerous organizations represented there. Interestingly, he
is described in one of the Conference Documents as 'Conference
sThis topic was briefly alluded to in Nyeko,'Background to
political instability ...' Ufahamu, ibid.
7D. Omara-Atubo, Why? The Uganda National Liberation Front,
The Gospel of Liberation, (Moshi, Tanzania, 1979).
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Organizer, Moshi'5. His account is basically a factual narrative
of the manoeuvring in both Dar es Salaam and Nairobi that
preceded the actual summoning of the various exile groups to
Moshi. It is also an interpretation of the proceedings of the
conference itself. If Omara-Atubo's pamphlet generally steers
clear of controversy over Moshi, it is quite obvious why
Professor Gertzel's scholarly and hence understandably neutral
discussion of the birth of the UNLF has relied upon it
substantially6. Gertzel stresses the fragility of the new
organization, pointing up especially the older social and
political divisions within the Ugandan body politic which the
UNLF does not appear to have overcome even as it declared itself
united in the anti-Amin struggle. This account contrasts sharply
with the pieces written by participants such as Dan Nabudere, a
member of the Dar es Salaam organising committee - the 'Gang of
Four' as they were described by their political opponents - who
later became an official in the UNLF government. It is also a
more balanced account compared with the interpretations offered
by the major political contestants at the time such as Obote and
Museveni7. While all three can be faulted for being clearly self-
justifying, they nevertheless provide extremely useful glimpses
into the story from 'within' . Nabudere vigorously defends his Dar
es Salaam group against charges that they acted undemocraticaily
^Africa Contemporary Record, vol. X (1978-79),p.B445.
6Gertzel,'Uganda after Amin', p.462-6$.
7D. W. Nabuciere,Imperialism • and Revolution in Uganda,
London: Onyx Press; Dar es Salaam: T.P.H, 1980, p. 331-46; Speech
Delivered by A. Milton Obote at Kolqlo Airstrip, Kampala, on 7th
June, 1980 (Typescript); Y. Museveni, Selected Articles on the
Uganda Resistance War, Kampala: NRM Publications, 1985.
in literally hand-picking delegates to the Moshi Conference and
excluding those groups - such as Obote's UPC - with whose
political views they disagreed. He is particularly critical of
the UPC and the ULGC2), both of whom he correctly labels as pro-
Obote. He accuses them of disrupting the conference through
raising numerous points of order8. Museveni, on the other hand,
appears.to have adopted a staunchly 'militarist' approach by
insisting that representation of the various organisations
present at Moshi should be based on their military strength.
However, his claims to a considerable military following within
Uganda around this time appears to have been rather exaggerated
and were certainly questioned by his political opponents. Obote's
own views on the Moshi Conference, which he was to repeat several
times during his second Presidency, were that the meeting had
been manipulated to marginalize his own party9. This position was
shared by the ULG(Z), which under the newly assumed - but
unacknowledged - name of the 'Clean Uganda Movement' (CUM),
issued a document in Lusaka soon after the Moshi Conference
questioning several aspects of the proceedings and decisions of
the meeting. Entitled New Uganda 1979-1980: Comments on the Moshi
Conference, the Uganda National Liberation Front, the Office of
the President in the New Uganda, and the Role of Comrade Obote,
the document was extremely critical of the Dar es Salaam-based
Conference.Organisers.
The Origins of the ULG(Z)
In its manifesto which was formally adopted at a meeting
%abudere, Imperialism and Revolution ...,p.334.
^Speech at Kololo Airstrip.
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held in Lusaka on March 12, 1978, the ULG(Z) recognized that 'the
task of liberating Uganda [required] the joint efforts of many
forces within and outside Uganda'10. A striking aspect of the
document was its emphasis on unity and the need to 'mobilize ...
the workers, peasants, the youth, intellectuals and all popular
democratic organizations of ... Ugandans'. Among its professed
organisational principles were 'a democratic and unified
discipline [system]', 'democratic consultations' and 'collective
leadership, collective responsibility and individual
accountability'11. Membership was open to any Ugandan 'of the
apparent age of 15 years and above', which would have included
children of the adult exiles themselves. The manifesto does not,
however, specifically state that residence in Zambia was indeed
a pre-requisite for membership although this was clearly implied
in the organization's name. Finally, one of the provisions of the
manifesto that was used by the leadership in October 1978 to
declare its agreement to work with Obote was item 6 of Article
Ten, entitled 'Powers of General Meetings'. These included the
power 'to determine or approve other persons, groups or
organisations with .which the ULG may conduct negotiations for the
purpose of forging unity, a merger, cooperation .,.'12.
Given the background of the majority of the Ugandan citizens
who had arrived as exiles in Zambia from 1971 onwards, it was not
surprising that the social composition of the ULG(Z) membership
"The Uganda Liberation Group (in Zambia): The Manifesto,
Lusaka, March 12, 1978 (Typescript) •, p. 1.
1!Ibid, p.2.
I2Ibi<3, p.10.
reflected their- middle class status. Comprising'•.^almost
exclusively professionals such as doctors, school teachers,
lawyers, University lecturers and students, the group clearly
belonged to the strata of educated Ugandan elites for whom it was
relatively easy to start a new life outside their own country.
Significantly, there were hardly any former politicians or army
officers within their ranks; they all lacked any solid previous
experience in government and the majority were probably
apolitical. Moreover, their physical separation from Uganda
obviously compounded their lack of touch With the masses. Thus
the founding - and only - Chairman of the Group was the
relatively elderly but rather bland and colourless Emmanuel A.
Oteng, a former High Court judge who was now working for the
Zambian government; the Secretary was S.K. Kabogorwa, a lecturer
in Adult Education at the University of Zambia who had previously
worked as an administrator in the Uganda Public Service. Other
key members of the group who were subsequently to become Cabinet
Ministers in the Binaisa government of 1979-80 - and who were in
the group labelled by Colin Legum as the UPC/pro-Obote faction
of the National Consultative Council (NCC) of the Uganda
National Liberation Front (UNLF) 1 3- include A.K. Tiberondwa, an
education lecturer at the University of Zambia and J.K. Luwuliza-
Kirunda, a medical doctor working at the University Teaching
Hospital in Lusaka and subsequently (from 1981) Secretary General
of Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC).
In terms of its origins, this group may be traced to early
13C. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and
Documents, vol. XII (1979-1980), p. B348-B349.
1977 when a number of Ugandan students met informally in Lusaka
to discuss issues related to their welfare in Zambia in
particular and to the possible co-operation' with other Ugandan
students' exile organizations in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam more
generally. As was the case with the other such similar groups
outside Uganda, ttie students' organisation in Zambia, though
clearly aligned politically with UPC sympathisers such as A.K.
Tiberondwa and others, was extremely cautious about engaging in
overt political activity that might place their relatives back
in Uganda at risk. This is quite evident from the tone of the
exchange of letters - in the form of open circulars dated April
1977 - between themselves and the Uganda Students Association of
Dar es Salaam University (USAD). While the conflict between the
two,student groups seemed to centre on the internal and external
ramifications of the USAD president's controversial action in
despatching a telegram to Gadaffi condemning him and Amin, the
principal message from the USAD was that the rather more militant
approach to resistance apparently advocated by the Zambia-based
group was both 'adventurist and undemocratic'14. In reality,
however, the divergence of opinion appears to have been closely
intertwined with the perceived position of the Zambia-based
student group which was known to be pro-Obote and that of the Dar
students, which appears to have been greatly influenced by the
}*Ms in author's possession: Uganda Students at the
University of Zambia - a bunch of muddleheaded reactionaries, 26
April 1977 by A. Magara; The Disgraced Byamugisha's Sheep - The
Uganda Students at UNZA, 30 April 1977 by A.B. Kayonga; and
Chairman, USAD, to The President of Uganda, 23 March 1977. The
USAD documents vigorously defend Rugumayo and Nabudere gainst
charges by a 'Patriot' based in Lusaka accusing both gentlemen
as 'sellouts', 'traitors' and 'Amin's bootlickers' for having
worked under him.
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Nabudere-led group of academics working at the University. For
most of its first year of ^ existence, however, the ULG(Z) - like
its counterparts elsewhere in East Africa and Europe - was
largely pre-occupied with the social welfare of its members and
the, countering of the Amin propaganda by disseminating as much
information as possible about the reality on the ground inside
Uganda. Other concerns included the organisation of relief for
newly arrived exiles, the holding of discussions on Uganda and
the search for educational scholarships for Ugandan refugees15.
An accurate record of the exact numbers is unavailable, but an
estimate of the total membership within Lusaka cannot have been
much more than a hundred and fifty at most. As the Tanzania-
Uganda conflict broke out during October 1978, the group openly
declared its support for the war and pledged.to work with Obote.
Members were encouraged to make financial contributions for 'the
war effort' and several officials of the group made extended
visits to Dar es Salaam between January and April 197916. When
the Moshi unity conference was announced for March 1979, the
ULG(Z) was one of the first organisations to claim
representation. Apart from the tension created by the group's
arguments with the Dar organisers of the conference, the ULG(Z)
faced its own internal difficulties in the aftermath of the
•'This entailed collaboration with similar groups overseas.
For comparison, see Secretary's Report, 1977/78, in Umoja:
Ugandan Voices, A Publication of the Uganda Group for Human
Rights (UGHR) (London), no. l(Aug.-Nov. 1978), p.3-5. In Zambia,
some of the social programmes of the ULG(Z) were co-ordinated by
A.K. Tiberondwa, a member of the organisation's Executive
Committee.
^Personal information from A.K. Tiberondwa, one of those
who spent nearly three months in Dar 'co-ordinating the war
effort1.
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meeting when some members queried the criteria for the choice of
the group's representation. It appeared momentarily that these
differences might lead to a split along 'tribal' lines17.
The ULG(Z) in Historical Perspective
In her study- of post-Amin. Uganda, Gertzel notes that by
April 1979 the 'old divisions in local society' within Uganda had
tragically not been destroyed by the Amin regime18. These
divisions were certainly reflected in the exile politics
conducted in Zambia. In August 1977, for instance, a clandestine
unity meeting of various Ugandan exile groups from East Africa,
Europe and the Americas was held in Lusaka. Although the Uganda
National Movement (UNM) was formed at this meeting, it turned
out to have been stillborn. More ominously, however, the UNM -
whose leader was the Crown Prince of Ankole Kingdom, John
Barigye, turned diplomat - comprised largely the anti-UPC
elements, thus setting it in direct opposition to the ULG(Z)19.
Yet a further significant and potentially extremely dangerous
difference was that while the ULG(Z) membership comprised largely
exiles hailing from northern and eastern Uganda, the UNM was
evidently an organisation of Ugandans mainly from the southern
and western regions of the country. This polarisation of the
'This emerged at the group's first post-Moshi meeting in
early April 1979, when it was claimed that Acholi members were
left out and it appeared to some critics that loyalty to the
group was judged by closeness to the UPC leadership. Personal
communication.
13Gertzel, 'Uganda after Amin', p. 477.
i3Gertzel, 'Uganda after Amin', p. 464-5; Nyeko, 'Background
to political instability', p. 24.
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exile population fitted neatly into the 'tribal' interpretation
of the recent colonial and post-colonial history of Uganda which
has attracted a considerable amount of comments from various
scholars20.
Students of the colonial history of Uganda have long
recognized the way in which the country was often regarded as
comprising these two major divisions. Whether one agrees with
this classification or not, the socio-economic differences
between the 'north' and the 'south' were clearly sharpened by
colonialism itself over the years. An import ant.legacy was the
unequal economic power-sharing in post-colonial Uganda. The
creation of the ULG(Z), as with other exile bodies, was most
indirectly a product of this legacy21.
Resistance pre-1977: an illusion?
' As noted earlier, the image of the exiles and the Tanzanian
troops who stormed into Kampala in April 1979 as the real
'liberators' of Uganda has rightly been questioned. For within
a short period, the country was disenchanted with the political
malaise which the UNLF itself seemed to generate through the
numerous internal squabbles and endless debates and arguments.
Moreover, both the socio-economic and security situation in the
country appeared no better than previously. Ugandans had been
^See, for example, Y. Tandon, 'Elements of continuity and
change between Obote and Museveni: some lessons from Obote's rule
for Museveni's government1, Ufahamu, vol. 15, no. 3(1986/87),
p.79-97; M. Mamdani,'NRA/NRM: Two Years in Power' (Makerere
University,1988).
the way in which 'history' impacted on the activities
of some of the political actors in post-Amin Uganda during 1979-
80, see Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, p.153.
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'liberated' from the tyranny of the Amin regime, but they had
clearly not yet escaped its legacy. Was 'liberation' then a mere
catchword for opportunist Ugandan exiles? Or did their activities
contribute anything significant to Uganda's efforts to resist the
Amin regime? A related question is to what extent those who cite
the lack of any re.al organised internal resistance prior to the
Tanzania-Uganda war in explaining the relative longevity of the
regime are justified in doing so. We must now turn to a brief
overview of the internal situation from the coup in January 1971
to around the middle of 1977.
There now exist several useful scholarly as well as more
journalistic studies of this period with particular reference to
internal efforts at overthrowing the Amin regime. Olara-Otunnu22,
for example, identifies at least four main forms in which
resistance was presented. Apart from the Obote-led Dar es Salaam-
based exiles' abortive invasion of September 1972, there were
the more clandestine early guerilla activities of Yoweri
Museveni's Front for National Salvation (FRONASA). The regime's
response in both instances was both swift and heavy-handed: the
post-invasion arrests and massacre of civilians particularly from
the Acholi and Lango ethnic groups in northern Uganda, regarded
as Obote's mainstay of support, was widely reported. Similarly,
the public execution of several alleged FRONASA guerillas in
February 1973 - each in his home town of Gulu in the.north, Mbale
in eastern Uganda and Kabale in the south-west - was intended to
2i01ara-0tunnu, 'The Amin regime: some myths and realities,
1971 to 1878', Umoja: Ugandan Voices, 1(Aug.-Nov. 1878), p.13-18.
For comparison, see P.F.B. Nayenga, 'Myths and realities of Idi
Amin Dada's Uganda: a review article1, African Studies Review,
22, 2(Sept,1979), p. 127-38.
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demonstrate the regime's determination to stamp out resistance
. ' ' • • "
T
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and presumably score maximum deterrent effect. Yet by carrying
put these executions in nearly all the regions of the country
Amin had, by default, confirmed the increasingly widespread and
'national' character of the covert but growing opposition to his
government23. Thirdly, from as early as. July 1971 and throughout
the regime's existence, several internal military plots and
assassination attempts on Amin were widely reported. Given the
increasingly 'militarist' character of the regime as the years
passed, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that these plots
and conflicts would surely have amounted to little more than a
palace coup had they succeeded. . .
Finally, several other instances of opposition usually cited
include the strike action by the Kilembe Copper Mines workers in
1973, and the students' challenge to the government through their
National Union of Students (NUSU) organisation and the Makerere
Students' Guild24. A major turning point in the resistance
movement was the February 1977 murder of Archbishop Janani Luwum
and two Cabinet Ministers by the regime'. This: also clearly
marked the Church's entry point into open criticism of the Amin
government's excesses25. By this stage, both internal and
external resistance had become a great deal more intense and
"it ought to be noted, though, that up to this point Amin
still enjoyed considerable support in several parts of the
country, not least because of his expulsion of the. Asians a few
months back. See, among others, P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since
Independence, p.98-100.
"oiara-Otunnu, 'Myths and Realities'; a useful account is
B. Langlands, 'Students and politics in Uganda', African Affairs,
76, 302(Jan. 1977), p.3-20.
25Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, p.112ff.
' ).:\'i'. . 1 5 . . •
widespread. Internally, one of its most striking features was
that it had come to cut across tribe, religion, region as well
as political and ideological orientation. Externally, the mass
exodus of refugees after February 1977 provided evidence to the
outside world that support for the anti-Amin resistance had been
long overdue. It also acted as a source of inspiration for the
exiles to emerge in the open.
As Olara-Otunnu correctly argues, the internal opposition
to the Amin regime failed to overthrow it because it had been
'sporadic and isolated' and had not been successfully 'translated
into a grassroots resistance movement'26. Evidently, there was
widespread popular discontent but this had not found the avenues
through which it could be expressed concretely and effectively.
While this point is commonsensical enough, it does help reiterate
the argument that resistance was not an illusion, and that it had
begun as soon as the January coup itself had been carried out27.
The connections between these internal efforts and the activities
of the fledgling exile organisations, however, are hard to
establish at this stage.
Conclusions
It will be obvious that the present paper is by no means
definitive; it is merely an early attempt to construct a research
agenda for the historical understanding of Ugandan exile politics
during the Amin years. The UNLF was an umbrella organisation
comprising a variety of social groups with unclearly defined
^Olara-Otunnu,'Myths and Realities',p.15.
'•See, for example, Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence,p.81.
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political ideologies. Its short-!ived existence may have been of
rather little immediate political consequence for Uganda as it
fizzled out almost within a year of its formation, but its
historical significance cannot surely be underestimated. The
ULG(Z), as a component part of the Front, would similarly seem
to deserve study. If neither body could be remotely described as
representing the 'popular will', at the very least their history
would appear to help explain why the achievement of popular
democracy in an ex-colony with a such a complex 'tribal' history
was so complicated.
As for the possibility of any comparisons that might be
drawn from here for Southern Africa, it would certainly be rash
to suggest any at this time, given the underdeveloped nature of
the study. The working out of a new form of democracy is
currently under way in Uganda. Clearly, the theme is beyond the
scope of the present paper, but it may well-be the case that the
exercise is a vindication of the argument that the country's
failures in this area were the result of its past. Uganda appears
to fit neatly into the History Workshop organisers' category of
a 'poor country' with a history of 'weak state structures'. The
UNLF and its component parts were the product of this history.
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